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Abstract
This paper analyzes Pareto optimal non-linear taxation of profits and labor income
in a private information economywith endogenous firm formation. Individuals differ
in both their skill and their cost of setting up a firm, and choose between becoming
workers and entrepreneurs. I show that a tax system in which entrepreneurial profits
and labor income must be subject to the same non-linear tax schedule makes use of
general equilibrium (or “trickle down”) effects through wages to indirectly achieve
redistribution between entrepreneurs and workers. As a result, constrained Pareto
optimal policies can involve low marginal tax rates at the top and, if available, in-
put taxes that distort the firms’ input choices. However, these properties disappear
when a differential tax treatment of profits and labor income is possible. In this case,
redistribution is achieved directly through the tax system rather than “trickle down”
effects, and production efficiency is always optimal.
∗Email address: scheuer@stanford.edu. I thank Daron Acemoglu, Robert Barro, Peter Diamond, Roger
Gordon, James Poterba, Emmanuel Saez, Karl Scholz, IvánWerning, and numerous seminar participants for
valuable comments and suggestions. I owe special thanks to Stefania Albanesi and Christian Keuschnigg
for discussions of this paper at the NBER TAPES conference 2012 (Oxford). All errors are my own. Some
results in this paper were part of the earlier working paper circulated under the title “Entrepreneurial
Taxation and Occupational Choice.”
1 Introduction
The question at what rate business profits should be taxed – notably relative to the tax
rates on other forms of income such as labor earnings – is a recurring and controversial
theme in the public policy debate. On the one hand, it is often argued that individuals
who receive business profits, such as entrepreneurs, tend to be better off than those who
do not. Therefore, arguments based on direct redistribution, or “tagging,” seem to justify
the taxation of profits at a higher rate than other forms of income, as for instance imple-
mented by a corporate income tax and the resulting double taxation of profits both at the
firm and individual level. On the other hand, proponents of “supply side” or “trickle
down economics” typically emphasize the general equilibrium effects of the tax treat-
ment of businesses. In particular, they point out that a reduction in the entrepreneurs’
tax burden encourages entrepreneurial activity and labor demand. It thereby increases
wages and hence “trickles down” to medium or lower income workers, achieving redis-
tribution indirectly. From this perspective, a reduced taxation of firm profits, or even a
subsidization of entrepreneurial activities, appears optimal.
Underlying these opposing arguments is the question to what degree an optimal tax
system should rely on indirect general equilibrium, or “trickle down” effects to achieve
redistribution and affect occupational choice. To study this issue formally, I construct a
simple model in which the production side is managed by entrepreneurs and both wages
and the decision to become a worker or an entrepreneur are endogenous. In particular,
individuals are characterized by two-dimensional heterogeneity: Agents differ in their
cost of (or preference for) setting up a firm, and in their skill, both of which are private
information. They can either choose to become a worker, in which case they supply labor
at the endogenous wage rate, or select to be an entrepreneur. In this case, they hire work-
ers and provide entrepreneurial effort, which are combined to produce the consumption
good.
I characterize Pareto optimal allocations in this economy and demonstrate that the
resulting multidimensional screening problem is tractable and allows for a transparent
analysis of the issues raised above. The key result is that it crucially depends on the set of
available tax instruments whether a Pareto optimal tax system uses general equilibrium
effects to achieve redistribution indirectly through “trickle down.” I start with consid-
ering constrained Pareto optimal allocations when the government imposes the same,
non-linear tax schedule on both entrepreneurial profits and labor income. Analyzing this
uniform taxation case is a natural benchmark to start with from a policy perspective since
the US and many other countries indeed impose the same (federal) income tax schedule
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on employed workers and self-employed entrepreneurs. In addition, this policy is of-
ten viewed as particularly appealing in light of the general presumption that introducing
wedges between different forms of income is distorting and should therefore be avoided.
For instance, in the Mirrlees Review, Crawford and Freedman (2010) argue that the tax
system should aim at neutrality and align tax rates for the employed and self-employed.
However, even though such a tax policy does not explicitly distort the occupational
choice margin, it puts severe limitations on the amount of redistribution that can be
achieved between entrepreneurs and workers. Due to two-dimensional heterogeneity,
the income distributions of workers and entrepreneurs have overlapping supports: There
are high-skilled agents who remain workers since they have a high cost of setting up a
firm, low-skilled agents who enter entrepreneurship because of their low cost of doing
so, and vice versa. It is therefore impossible for a tax system to distinguish workers and
entrepreneurs just based on their income. Formally, a policy that does not condition tax
schedules on occupational choice puts a no-discrimination constraint on the Pareto prob-
lem, since it rules out discriminating between entrepreneurs and workers of different
ability levels that are related by the endogenous wage rate.1
In the presence of this restriction, a Pareto optimal tax schedule indeed reflects some
“trickle down” logic. I show that, if wages are not fixed by technology, the tax system
explicitly manipulates incentives in order to induce general equilibrium effects through
wages and thus achieve redistribution between entrepreneurs and workers indirectly,
given that direct redistribution based on income is not possible. For instance, I provide
conditions under which, if the government aims at redistributing from entrepreneurs to
workers, top earning entrepreneurs are subsidized at the margin, as this encourages their
effort and raises the workers’ wage. This relaxes the no-discrimination constraints and
therefore allows for additional redistribution in this case. As a result, optimal marginal
tax rates not only depend on the skill distribution and wage elasticities of effort, as in
standard models, but also on the degree of substitutability of labor and entrepreneurial
effort in production. Moreover, I show that if the government has access to additional tax
instruments, such as (non-linear) input taxes, it is generally optimal to distort marginal
rates of substitution across firms in order to affect wages.
It turns out, however, that these non-standard properties of optimal tax systems, such
as negative marginal tax rates at the top and production inefficiency, crucially rely on the
restriction that there is only a single tax schedule for both entrepreneurs and workers. In
1For this reason, a comparison between uniform and differential taxation of entrepreneurs and work-
ers cannot sensibly be done without accounting for multidimensional heterogeneity. Models with one-
dimensional heterogeneity result in income distributions for the occupations that occupy non-overlapping
intervals. In this special case, uniform income taxation is not restrictive.
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fact, I show that they disappear as soon as the government can make firm profits and la-
bor income subject to different non-linear tax schedules. A Pareto optimal tax policy can
now achieve redistribution directly through differential taxation rather than indirectly
through general equilibrium effects. For this reason, optimal marginal tax rate formu-
las no longer depend on substitution elasticities between different inputs in the firms’
production function. Furthermore, even if the government could impose distorting in-
put taxes in addition to the non-linear tax schedules on profits and labor income, this is
not needed to implement constrained Pareto optima: With differential taxation, produc-
tion efficiency is always optimal. I also show that, with differential taxation, the “trickle
down” logic does not apply. In fact, when redistributing from entrepreneurs to workers,
for instance, a Pareto optimal tax system does so in a way that depresses the workers’
wage, who are of course more than compensated by tax transfers.2 3
Related Literature. This paper contributes to a large literature that has studied the
effects of tax policy on economies explicitly incorporating entrepreneurship. In partic-
ular, there has been considerable interest recently in using calibrated dynamic general
equilibrium models with an entrepreneurial sector, such as those developed by Quadrini
(2000), Meh and Quadrini (2004), and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), to quantitatively ex-
plore how various stylized tax reforms affect the equilibriumwealth distribution, welfare,
and investment. For instance, Meh (2005) and Zubricky (2007) have studied the effects of
moving from a progressive to a flat income tax system in such economies, Cagetti and
De Nardi (2009) have analyzed how an elimination of estate taxation would affect wealth
accumulation andwelfare, and Panousi (2008) and Kitao (2008) have computed the effects
of capital taxation on entrepreneurial investment and capital accumulation. Yet none of
these studies have aimed at characterizing and computing optimal tax systems in en-
trepreneurial economies, which is the focus of the present paper.4
In characterizing optimal allocations, my work therefore shares a common goal with
2While it is sometimes argued that it may be difficult to distinguish entrepreneurial and other labor
income, there are in fact countries that treat employed workers and self-employed small business owners
differently for tax and social insurance purposes. In the UK, for instance, social insurance contributions
differ between employed and self-employed.
3In the longer working paper version (Scheuer, 2013b), I numerically compute the optimal tax schedules
for profits and labor earnings in an economy that is calibrated to match income distributions and occupa-
tional choice between entrepreneurship and employment in the 2007 Survey Consumer Finances.
4There is also related research that has focused on how taxes affect more specific aspects of en-
trepreneurial activity. For example, Kanbur (1981), Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), Kihlstrom and Laffont
(1983), Christiansen (1990) and Cullen and Gordon (2007) have examined the effects of taxation on en-
trepreneurial risk-taking. Moreover, the consequences of a differential tax treatment of corporate versus
non-corporate businesses (or of its removal) for investment have been the focus of Gordon (1985), Gravelle
and Kotlikoff (1989) and Meh (2008). See Gentry and Hubbard (2000) for an overview of these issues. I
abstract from a distinction of firms in corporate and non-corporate in this paper.
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Albanesi (2006, 2008) and Shourideh (2010) who have extended the framework of opti-
mal dynamic taxation to account for entrepreneurial investment. More precisely, they
consider moral hazard models where entrepreneurs exert some hidden action that af-
fects a stochastic return to capital. Their focus is on characterizing the optimal savings
distortions that entrepreneurs should face when the government provides insurance for
entrepreneurial investment risk. Similarly, Chari, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2002) examine
optimal intertemporal wedges in a dynamic economy with start-up firms and incom-
plete markets. In contrast to this literature, I focus on characterizing optimal taxation
in a static general equilibrium model that allows for endogenous wages and entry into
entrepreneurship, providing a complementary contribution.
The paper also builds on earlier research on optimal income taxation in models with
endogenous wages and occupational choice, such as Feldstein (1973), Zeckhauser (1977),
Allen (1982), Boadway, Marceau, and Pestieau (1991), and Parker (1999). This literature
has restricted attention to linear taxation and typically ruled out a differential tax treat-
ment of the occupational groups. An exception is the work by Moresi (1997), who consid-
ers non-linear taxation of profits. However, in his model, the occupational choice margin
is considerably simplified and heterogeneity is confined to affect one occupation only, not
the other. Stiglitz (1982) and Naito (1999) study optimal non-linear taxation in economies
with two ability types and endogenous wages. While some of their results translate to
properties of Pareto optimal tax systems with uniform taxation of profits and income,
their models do not include different occupational groups. Therefore, neither of these pa-
pers allow for the comparison of uniform and differential taxation of profits and income,
and of the optimal (non-linear) tax schedules of workers and entrepreneurs in the case of
differential taxation, which is performed here.
In addition, restricting heterogeneity to affect one occupation only, or tax schedules
to be linear, sidesteps the complexities of multidimensional screening, which emerges
naturally in the present model. In fact, few studies in the optimal taxation literature have
attempted to deal with multidimensional screening problems until recently. Closest to the
formal modelling approach used here is the recent contribution by Kleven, Kreiner, and
Saez (2009) with an application to the optimal income taxation of couples. Related work
by Rothschild and Scheuer (2011, 2013) considers optimal income taxation in occupational
choice economies with multidimensional skill heterogeneity, where individuals can have
different skills in different occupations. Their structure of private information therefore
differs from the one considered here and their focus is on uniform taxation only. More
generally, this paper builds on the large literature on optimal income taxation following
the seminal contributions by Diamond andMirrlees (1971) andMirrlees (1971). However,
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rather than focusing on allocations that maximize some utilitarian social welfare criterion,
I aim at characterizing the set of Pareto optimal tax policies, sharing the spirit of Werning
(2007).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model and
the equilibrium without taxation. In Section 3, I start with characterizing Pareto optimal
tax policies when the same (non-linear) tax schedule is applied to both entrepreneurial
profits and labor income. Properties of Pareto optimal tax schedules and the optimality
of production distortions are discussed. As I show in Section 4, these properties disappear
when profits and income can be made subject to different tax schedules. Section 4 also
computes the two tax schedules for a calibrated economy. Finally, Section 5 provides a
discussion of possible extensions and concludes. Most of the proofs are relegated to the
appendix.
2 The Baseline Model
2.1 Preference Heterogeneity and Occupational Choice
I consider a unit mass of heterogeneous individuals who are characterized by a two-
dimensional type vector (θ, φ) ∈ [θ, θ]× [φ
θ
, φθ], where θ will be interpreted as an indi-
vidual’s skill, and φ as an individual’s cost of or taste for becoming an entrepreneur, as
explained in more detail below.5 F(θ) is the cumulative distribution function of θ and
Gθ(φ) the cumulative distribution function of φ conditional on θ, both assumed to allow
for density functions f (θ) and gθ(φ). Note that this allows for an arbitrary correlation
between θ and φ. Both θ and φ are an individual’s private information.
Agents can choose between two occupations: They can become a worker, in which
case they supply effective labor l at the (endogenous) wage w. Abstracting from income
effects, I assume preferences over consumption c and labor to be quasi-linear with
U(c, l, θ) ≡ c− ψ(l/θ).
An individual’s disutility of effort ψ(.) is assumed to be twice continuously differen-
tiable, increasing and convex. A particular specification, used later, is given by ψ(l/θ) =
(l/θ)1+1/ε/(1+ 1/ε), which implies that the individual’s elasticity of labor supply with
respect to the wage is constant and equal to ε. θ captures an individual’s skill type in
the sense that a higher value of θ implies that the individual has a lower disutility of
5I assume θ > 0 and θ, φθ < ∞ for most of the analysis.
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providing a given amount of effective labor l.
Alternatively, an agent may select to become an entrepreneur. In this case, she hires
effective labor L and provides effective entrepreneurial effort E to produce output of the
consumption good Y, where Y(L, E) is a concave neoclassical firm-level production func-
tion with constant returns to scale. An entrepreneur’s profits are then pi = Y(L, E)− wL
and her utility is given by
U(pi, E, θ)− φ ≡ pi − ψ(E/θ)− φ.
φ is a heterogeneous utility cost of becoming an entrepreneur, which is distributed in the
population as specified above, possibly depending on the skill type θ. Thus, θ determines
an individual’s skill in both occupations, but in addition, people differ in their idiosyn-
cratic preferences for one of the two occupations, as captured by φ. The cost φ can there-
fore be interpreted as a shortcut for heterogeneity in the population that is not otherwise
captured in the present model explicitly, such as a differences in setup costs, attitudes to-
wards entrepreneurial risks, or non-pecuniary benefits from being an entrepreneur (e.g. a
preference for being one’s own boss).6 As a result of the two-dimensional heterogeneity,
there will not be a perfect ranking between occupational choice and skill type (and thus
income): For a given θ, there are individuals who enter entrepreneurship and others who
become workers due to their different φ-type. This is an empirically attractive implica-
tion of the present specification, since, in reality, the income distributions of workers and
entrepreneurs do have overlapping supports.7
2.2 The Equilibrium without Taxes
In order to introduce themechanics of this basicmodel, let me start with briefly discussing
the equilibrium without taxes. Taking the wage w as given, conditional on becoming a
worker, an individual of skill-type θ solvesmaxl wl−ψ(l/θ)with solution l∗(θ,w) and in-
direct utility vW(θ,w) ≡ wl∗(θ,w)−ψ(l∗(θ,w)/θ). Similarly, conditional on becoming an
entrepreneur, type θ solvesmaxL,E Y(L, E)−wL−ψ(E/θ)with solution L∗(θ,w), E∗(θ,w)
and indirect utility vE(θ,w). Then the occupational choice decision for individuals of type
6This means that φ could in principle take positive or negative values for different individuals. Whether
φ is positive or negative for most individuals determines the equilibrium return to effort of entrepreneurs
relative to workers. See Section 5 for a discussion of the related evidence.
7This is in contrast to models where occupational choice is only based on skill heterogeneity, such as
Boadway, Marceau, and Pestieau (1991) and Moresi (1997), and where it is assumed that one occupation
rewards ability more than the other. Then there exists a critical skill level such that all higher skilled agents
select into the high-reward occupation, and lower-ability agents into the other. This results in income
distributions for the two occupations that occupy non-overlapping intervals (see e.g. Parker (1999)).
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θ is determined by the critical cost value
φ˜(θ,w) ≡

φ
θ
if vE(θ,w)− vW(θ,w) < φθ
φθ if vE(θ,w)− vW(θ,w) > φθ
vE(θ,w)− vW(θ,w) otherwise,
(1)
so that all (θ, φ) with φ ≤ φ˜(θ,w) become entrepreneurs, and the others workers. With
this notation, an equilibrium without taxes can be defined as follows:
Definition 1. An equilibriumwithout taxes is a wage w∗ and an allocation {l∗(θ,w∗), L∗(θ,w∗),
E∗(θ,w∗)} for all θ ∈ Θ ≡ [θ, θ] such that the labor market clears, i.e.∫
Θ
Gθ(φ˜(θ,w∗))L∗(θ,w∗)dF(θ) =
∫
Θ
(1− Gθ(φ˜(θ,w∗)))l∗(θ,w∗)dF(θ). (2)
In fact, the entrepreneurs’ utility maximization problem can be decomposed as fol-
lows. Since their labor demand L only affects profits and not the other components
of their utility, for given E and w, entrepreneurs of all types θ solve the same problem
maxL Y(L, E)−wL with the conditional labor demand function Lc(E,w) as solution such
that YL(Lc(E,w), E) = w. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, Euler’s
theorem implies
Y(Lc(E,w), E) = YL(Lc(E,w), E)Lc(E,w) + YE(Lc(E,w), E)E,
and thus an entrepreneur’s profits are given by
pi = Y(Lc(E,w), E)− wLc(E,w) = YE(Lc(E,w), E)E.
Hence, entrepreneurs can be thought of just receiving a different wage w˜ ≡ YE on their
effort. Moreover, there exists a decreasing one-to-one relationship between the work-
ers’ and the entrepreneurs’ wage w˜(w):8 The entrepreneurs’ wage w˜ is high if the en-
trepreneurial effort to labor ratio used in production is low, whichmeans that themarginal
product of labor and thus the workers’ wage is low.
With these insights, the following properties of the equilibrium without taxes can be
established:
8This is because, by linear homogeneity of Y, both YL and YE are homogeneous of degree zero and hence
functions of x ≡ E/L only. Then w˜(w) is a decreasing function because w˜ = YE(x) = YE(Y−1L (w)) and
YE(x) is decreasing and YL(x) increasing in x by concavity of Y (and therefore the inverse Y−1L (w) from
YL(x) = w is a decreasing function).
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Proposition 1. Consider the no tax equilibrium as defined in Definition 1. If φ
θ
≥ 0 (φθ ≤ 0)
for all θ ∈ Θ,
(i) the entrepreneurs’ wage is higher (lower) than the workers’ wage, i.e. w˜∗ ≡ w˜(w∗) > (<)w∗,
and for all θ ∈ Θ, E∗(θ, w˜∗) > (<)l∗(θ,w∗),
(ii) the critical cost value for occupational choice φ˜(θ,w∗) is increasing (decreasing) in θ, and
(iii) the share of entrepreneurs Gθ(φ˜(θ,w∗)) is increasing (decreasing) in θ if Gθ′(φ) )FOSD
Gθ(φ) for θ′ ≤ (≥)θ.
Proof. Consider the case with φ
θ
≥ 0 for all θ (the case φθ ≤ 0 is completely analogous). (i) Recall that
vW(θ,w∗) = maxl w∗l − ψ(l/θ) and vE(θ, w˜∗) = maxE w˜∗E− ψ(E/θ). Suppose, by way of contradiction,
w˜∗ ≤ w∗. Then vE(θ, w˜∗) ≤ vW(θ,w∗), and hence by (1), φ˜(θ,w∗) = φθ for all θ ∈ Θ. Therefore (2) cannot be
satisfied. To see that E∗(θ, w˜∗) > l∗(θ,w∗), note first that, since the function wl − ψ(l/θ) is supermodular
in (w, l), l∗(θ,w) is increasing in w by Topkis’ theorem (see Topkis, 1998). By the same argument, since
w˜∗ > w∗ from (i), E∗(θ, w˜∗) > l∗(θ,w∗) for all θ ∈ Θ.
(ii) Using the results from (i),
∂φ˜(θ,w∗)
∂θ
= ψ′
(
E∗(θ, w˜∗)
θ
)
E∗(θ, w˜∗)
θ2
− ψ′
(
l∗(θ,w∗)
θ
)
l∗(θ,w∗)
θ2
> 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ
by the envelope theorem and convexity of ψ.
(iii) If Gθ′(φ) )FOSD Gθ(φ) for θ′ ≤ θ, then
Gθ′(φ˜(θ′,w∗)) ≤ Gθ′(φ˜(θ,w∗)) ≤ Gθ(φ˜(θ,w∗)) for θ′ ≤ θ,
where the first inequality follows from (ii) and the second from first-order stochastic dominance.
Proposition 1 summarizes intuitive properties of wages and occupational choice in
equilibrium: First, if φ
θ
≥ 0, the entrepreneurs’ wage w˜∗ must be higher than that of
the workers w∗ in equilibrium. The reason is that, when deciding whether to become a
worker or an entrepreneur, an individual of a given skill type considers two variables: The
different wage that she can earn when becoming an entrepreneur rather than a worker,
and the cost φ ≥ 0 she has to incur when doing so. Clearly, if the entrepreneurs’ wage
were lower than that of workers, there would be no trade-off and nobody would choose
to enter entrepreneurship, which cannot be an equilibrium. The entrepreneurs’ higher
wage then immediately implies that they exert more effort and earn higher profits than
workers of the same ability level. Of course, the reversed results obtain if φθ ≤ 0, i.e.
everyone has a preference for entrepreneurship relative to employment conditional on
earning the same wage. Then the worker’s wage must exceed the entrepreneurs’ wage in
equilibrium.
The second result in the proposition is that, if w˜∗ > w∗, the higher the skill type θ,
the more the wage difference matters compared to the cost, which is why the critical cost
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value φ˜(θ,w∗) increases with θ. Finally, the same holds for the share of entrepreneurs
in equilibrium as a function of skill whenever skill and disutility from entrepreneurship
are independent or such that higher skills tend to have a lower disutility from being an
entrepreneur in the first-order stochastic dominance sense. Again, the opposite pattern
results if entrepreneurship is associated with a benefit for everyone and hence w˜∗ < w∗.
More generally, the model is flexible enough to generate more complicated relationships
between income and the share of entrepreneurs through the dependence of the cost dis-
tribution on θ, as captured by Gθ(φ).9
3 Uniform Tax Treatment of Profits and Income
3.1 A Constrained Pareto Problem
While the no tax equilibrium represents a particular point on the Pareto-frontier, other
Pareto optimal allocations can be implemented by suitable tax policies. Let me start with
characterizing the resulting Pareto-frontier under the assumption that the government
imposes a single non-linear tax schedule T(.) that applies to both the workers’ labor in-
come y ≡ wl and the entrepreneurs’ profits pi in the same way. Such a tax system may
seem particularly appealing on the grounds of neutrality, since it does not explicitly dis-
tort the occupational choice margin. It is also the system that is in place for employed
workers and self-employed small business owners in many countries, including the US.
Then the question is to what degree a Pareto-optimal tax policy makes use of general
equilibrium (“trickle down”) effects through the workers’ wage to achieve redistribution
indirectly.
With a tax on profits T(pi), entrepreneurs solvemaxL,E Y(L, E)−wL− T(Y(L, E)−wL)
−ψ(E/θ) and thus their labor demand is always undistorted such that YL = w for all
skill types θ. This implies that, by the same arguments as in the preceding section, en-
trepreneurs can be viewed as just receiving a different wage w˜ = YE than workers on
their effort E. Hence, entrepreneurs of type θ choose their effort so as to solve maxE w˜E−
T(w˜E)− ψ(E/θ), and workers of type θ solve maxl wl − T(wl)− ψ(l/θ). Since they face
the same tax schedule T(.), it immediately follows that the profits generated by an en-
trepreneur of type θ and the income earned by a worker of type θ′ with the same “total”
9In Scheuer (2013b), I calibrate Gθ(φ) to match the relationship between income and entrepreneurship
found in the data.
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wage on their effort, i.e. such that w˜θ = wθ′, must be equal:
w˜E(θ) = wl
(
w˜
w
θ
)
(3)
for all θ ∈ [a, b] with a = max {θ, (w/w˜)θ} and b = min {θ, (w/w˜)θ}. This is a no-
discrimination constraint on the Pareto-problem that results from the restriction that both
profits and income must be subject to the same tax schedule T(.): With this instrument,
it is impossible for the government to discriminate between individuals who earn the
same overall wage, even if in different occupations, namely entrepreneurs of skill θ and
workers of the rescaled skill (w˜/w)θ, whereby the rescaling factor w˜/w is endogenous
and corresponds to the ratio between the marginal products of entrepreneurial effort and
labor. The same no-discrimination constraints have to hold for consumption (or, equiva-
lently, utility), as I will note formally below.
In addition to the no-discrimination constraints, any allocation that can be imple-
mented with the single non-linear tax schedule T(.) must satisfy the following incentive
compatibility constraints by the revelation principle. Suppose the social planner assigns
labor supply l(θ) and consumption cW(θ) to each individual of skill type θ who chooses
to become a worker, and a labor demand and entrepreneurial effort bundle L(θ), E(θ) and
consumption cE(θ) to each θ-type who selects into entrepreneurship.10 Then the incentive
constraints can be written as
cW(θ)− ψ
(
l(θ)
θ
)
≥ cW(θˆ)− ψ
(
l(θˆ)
θ
)
∀θ, θˆ ∈ Θ, (4)
cE(θ)− ψ
(
E(θ)
θ
)
≥ cE(θˆ)− ψ
(
E(θˆ)
θ
)
∀θ, θˆ ∈ Θ (5)
and
YL(L(θ), E(θ)) = w ∀θ ∈ Θ. (6)
Constraint (6) is a result of the fact that the profit tax T(.) does not distort the entrepreneurs’
labor demand, and so all firms set it so as equalize the marginal product of labor to the
workers’ wage. Hence, the marginal products of entrepreneurial effort are also equalized
across firms with
YE(L(θ), E(θ)) = w˜ ∀θ ∈ Θ. (7)
10Since the cost φ enters utility additively, it is straightforward to see that, conditional on occu-
pational choice, individuals cannot be further separated based on φ. Hence, indexing the allocation
{l(θ), cW(θ), L(θ), E(θ), cE(θ)} by θ only is without loss of generality.
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Defining the indirect utility functions as
vW(θ) ≡ max
θˆ∈Θ
cW(θˆ)− ψ
(
l(θˆ)
θ
)
and vE(θ) ≡ max
θˆ∈Θ
cE(θˆ)− ψ
(
E(θˆ)
θ
)
∀θ ∈ Θ,
and observing that preferences satisfy single-crossing, it is a standard result that the in-
centive constraints (4) and (5) are satisfied if and only if the envelope conditions
v′W(θ) = ψ′
(
l(θ)
θ
)
l(θ)
θ2
and v′E(θ) = ψ′
(
E(θ)
θ
)
E(θ)
θ2
∀θ ∈ Θ (8)
hold and
l(θ) and E(θ) are non-decreasing.11 (9)
Incentive compatibility also requires that the critical cost values for occupational choice
are given by
φ˜(θ) = vE(θ)− vW(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ.12 (10)
Finally, the fact that a single tax schedule cannot discriminate between entrepreneurs of
skill θ and workers of skill (w˜/w)θ implies that their consumption (and, by (3), their
utility) must be the same, i.e.
vE(θ) = vW
(
w˜
w
θ
)
∀θ ∈ [a, b]. (11)
Figure 1 illustrates these relationships.
Summarizing these insights, the Pareto problem can be written as follows. Let the
social planner attach Pareto-weights to individuals depending on their two-dimensional
type vector, as captured by cumulative distribution functions F˜(θ) and G˜θ(φ).13 Then the
program is
max
{E(θ), L(θ), l(θ), vE(θ),
vW (θ), φ˜(θ),w, w˜}
∫
Θ
[
G˜θ(φ˜(θ))vE(θ)−
∫ φ˜(θ)
φ
θ
φdG˜θ(φ) + (1−G˜θ(φ˜(θ)))vW(θ)
]
dF˜(θ) (12)
subject to
∫
Θ
Gθ(φ˜(θ))L(θ)dF(θ) ≤
∫
Θ
(1− Gθ(φ˜(θ)))l(θ)dF(θ), (13)
11See, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Theorems 7.2 and 7.3, and Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez
(2009), online appendix.
12Again, additive separability of φ implies that any incentive compatible allocation must take a threshold
form such that, for all θ, there is some critical value φ˜(θ) such that all φ ≤ φ˜(θ) become entrepreneurs and
the others workers.
13Section 5 discusses how the results are affected when using a social welfare function rather than general
Pareto weights.
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Figure 1: Relationship between vE(θ) and vW(θ) with no-discrimination constraints
∫
Θ
Gθ(φ˜(θ)) [Y(L(θ), E(θ))− vE(θ)− ψ(E(θ)/θ)] dF(θ)
−
∫
Θ
(1− Gθ(φ˜(θ))) [vW(θ) + ψ(l(θ)/θ)] dF(θ) ≥ 0, (14)
and constraints (3), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11). Inequality (13) requires the total amount
of labor demand assigned to entrepreneurs not to exceed the total amount of labor sup-
ply assigned to workers. Similarly, (14) is the resource constraint that makes sure that
the total amount of resources produced by the entrepreneurs in the economy covers the
consumption allocated to entrepreneurs and workers.14
3.2 Properties of Constrained Pareto Optimal Tax Systems
Inspection of the constrained Pareto problem reveals that the wages w and w˜ enter the
program through the no-discrimination constraints (3), a property that is referred to as a
pecuniary externality. Intuitively, wages have first-order effects on welfare as their ratio
determines to what extent the income distributions of the two occupations overlap, and
hence which workers and entrepreneurs must be treated the same as a result of the non-
discriminating tax treatment of profits and labor income. This has consequences for the
amount of redistribution that can be achieved with a single tax schedule. For this rea-
son, whenever wages are not fixed by technology, the optimal tax policy exhibits some
14As is standard in the screening literature, I solve the Pareto problem ignoring the monotonicity con-
straint (9), assuming that it is not binding. Otherwise, the Pareto optimum would involve bunching of
some types. In the working paper version (Scheuer, 2013b), I check numerically whether the monotonicity
constraint is satisfied at the optimum, and find that bunching does not arise.
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non-standard properties. The following two propositions summarize characteristics of
constrained Pareto optimal tax systems.
Proposition 2. (i) If φ
θ
≥ 0 (φθ ≤ 0) ∀ θ ∈ Θ, then at any Pareto-optimum, w˜ > (<)w, and
w˜E(θ) > (<)wl(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
(ii) If Y(L, E) is linear and w˜ > (<)w, T′(wl(θ)) = T′(w˜E(θ)) = 0 (T′(wl(θ)) = T′(w˜E(θ)) =
0).
(iii) If Y(L, E) is not linear and w˜ > (<)w, T′(wl(θ)) and T′(w˜E(θ)) (T′(wl(θ)) and T′(w˜E(θ)))
have opposite signs whenever (3) and (11) bind for some θ ∈ Θ.
(iv) For instance, suppose the workers’ effort l(θ)/θ is increasing in θ and w˜ > w. If, at the opti-
mum, the no-discrimination constraints (3) and (11) bind in the≥-direction, then T′(wl(θ)) > 0
and T′(w˜E(θ)) < 0 (otherwise, the opposite holds).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The first part of Proposition 2 holds for the same reason as in the equilibrium without
taxes: Since profits and labor income are subject to the same tax treatment, if becoming
an entrepreneur is costly, the entrepreneurs’ marginal product must be higher than the
workers’, because otherwise nobody would choose to set up a firm. This implies that
the top earner at any such Pareto optimum is an entrepreneur, and the bottom earner a
worker.15 On the other hand, if entrepreneurship provides a utility benefit and so φ ≤ 0
for everyone, the opposite pattern results, with the bottom earner an entrepreneur and
the top earner a worker (and the no-discrimination constraints not binding at the bottom
of the skill distribution).
Part (ii) establishes that the standard results are obtained for the bottom and top
marginal tax rates if technology is linear so that wages are fixed: Both the bottom and
the top earners should face a zero marginal tax rate, as in Mirrlees (1971). However, this
is no longer necessarily true when technology is not linear, as shown in part (iii) of Propo-
sition 2. In this case, since the tax system is restricted not to treat labor income and profits
differently, and the ratio of wages determines which types of workers and entrepreneurs
have to be treated the same as a result, the optimal policy manipulates effort incentives
and thus wages to relax these no-discrimination constraints. This then allows for addi-
tional redistribution depending on the set of Pareto-weights.
The tax system can increase the workers’ relative to the entrepreneurs’ wage (i.e. de-
crease w˜/w) by encouraging entrepreneurial effort and discouraging labor supply. There-
fore, if w˜ > w and hence the set of top earners is exclusively given by entrepreneurs and
15It also implies that the no-discrimination constraints (3) and (11) do not bind at the top of the skill
distribution in this case: There does not exist a worker who achieves the same labor income as the highest
skill entrepreneurs’ profits, since w˜θ > wθ for all θ ∈ Θ. Hence a = θ and b = (w/w˜)θ.
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the lowest income is only earned by workers, the optimal tax schedule involves a nega-
tive marginal tax rate at the top and a positive marginal tax rate at the bottom in this case.
If, by contrast, the Pareto-weights are such that the no-discrimination constraints are re-
laxed by increasing w˜/w, the opposite pattern holds. Part (iv) in the proposition provides
conditions under which these cases occur. Under the natural assumption that the opti-
mal effort schedule for workers l(θ)/θ is increasing, it shows that the top marginal tax
rate is negative (and the bottom rate positive) whenever the optimum ignoring the no-
discrimination constraints would involve
vE(θ) < vW
(
w˜
w
θ
)
and w˜E(θ) < wl
(
w˜
w
θ
)
∀θ ∈ [a, b],
so that (3) and (11) bind in the ≥-direction at the constrained optimum. I will show in
Section 4 (Proposition 5) that this is the case if Pareto-weights are such that redistribution
from low-φ agents to high-φ agents is desirable, and thus from entrepreneurs to workers
who earn the same overall wage on their effort.
In addition to redistributing across income/profit-levels directly through the tax sched-
ule T(.), the tax system thus makes use of the indirect general equilibrium effects through
wages to achieve redistribution indirectly. This shows that optimal marginal tax rates de-
pend on the degree of substitutability between the inputs of the two occupations in the
firms’ production function. While most of the public finance literature has typically fo-
cused on wage elasticities of effort and the skill distribution to derive optimal tax rates
(e.g. Saez, 2001), Proposition 2 demonstrates that production elasticities are similarly im-
portant when tax policy is restricted to a single schedule.
This intuition is similar, although more intricate, to earlier models of taxation with en-
dogenous wages, notably Stiglitz (1982). He considers a two-class economy where high
and low ability workers’ labor supply enter a non-linear aggregate production function
differently. Then the top marginal tax rate is negative if the government aims at redis-
tributing from high to low skill agents, because subsidizing the high ability individuals’
labor supply reduces their wage and thus relaxes the binding incentive constraint pre-
venting high skill agents from imitating low skill agents.16 In the present occupational
choice model with two-dimensional heterogeneity, however, the income distributions of
entrepreneurs and workers overlap, so that the no-discrimination constraints can bind in
either direction. In particular, higher ability workersmay have to be prevented frommim-
icking lower skilled entrepreneurs, but since w˜ > w, it is also possible that lower skilled
16Allen (1982) analyzes optimal linear taxation with endogenous wages. In this case, the incentive effects
of taxes on wages through the labor supply of different income groups are less clear, since all agents face
the same marginal tax rate.
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entrepreneurs want to imitate higher ability workers given that the tax system does not
condition on occupational choice, even if the Pareto-weights imply redistribution from
high to low wage individuals. In fact, as shown by part (iv) of Proposition 2, what mat-
ters are the redistributive motives across occupations, and therefore across φ-types who
earn the same total wage, as implied by the Pareto-weights.17
The next results demonstrate the effects and desirability of additional tax instruments.
Proposition 3. (i) If, in addition to the non-linear tax T(.) on profits and income, the government
can impose a proportional tax on the firms’ labor input, then a Pareto-optimal tax system satisfies
T′(wl(θ)) = T′(w˜E(θ)) = 0 (T′(wl(θ)) = T′(w˜E(θ)) = 0) for w˜ > (<)w.
(ii) Moreover, if the government can distort YL(L(θ), E(θ)) across firms, e.g. through a non-
linear tax on labor input, then it is optimal to do so whenever Y(L, E) is not linear and the no-
discrimination constraints (3) and (11) bind for some θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The first part of Proposition 3 demonstrates that the properties derived in the last part
of Proposition 2 disappear when the government disposes of an additional instrument.
With a proportional tax on the firms’ labor input, entrepreneurs face a wage cost of τw
on their labor rather than the wage w that workers receive. This decouples the scaling
factor w˜/w in the no-discrimination constraints (3) and (11) from the marginal products
of entrepreneurial effort and labor in constraints (6) and (7), so that there remains no need
to affect them through the nonlinear tax schedule T(.). As a result, the top and bottom
marginal tax rates are again zero at any Pareto optimum, even if technology is not linear.
Whereas a profit tax, even when complemented by a proportional tax on labor inputs,
implies that marginal products of labor (and thus of entrepreneurial effort) are equalized
across firms, part (ii) shows that such production efficiency is not necessarily optimal in
this framework. Intuitively, by distorting marginal products of labor and effort across
firms, e.g. through a non-linear tax on the firms’ labor input, the government can make
the entrepreneurs’ wage w˜ vary with skill type. As a result, the rescaling factor w˜/w in
the no-discrimination constraints can also vary with θ, depending on how much (and
in which direction) the no-discrimination constraint binds locally. Then the government
faces a trade-off between production efficiency and relaxing the no-discrimination con-
straints, which generally involves some degree of production inefficiency at the optimum.
17Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) extend these results to a general Roymodel of occupational choice where
individuals can have different skills for different sectors and preferences allow for income effects. They also
numerically compute Pareto optimal uniform tax schedules in this setting.
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This is in contrast to the Diamond-Mirrlees Theorem (Diamond andMirrlees, 1971) in set-
tings without pecuniary externalities.18
4 Differential Tax Treatment of Profits and Income
In this section, I relax the assumption that the government can only impose a single non-
linear tax schedule that applies to both labor income and entrepreneurial profits. In con-
trast, suppose the government is able to condition taxes on occupational choice and thus
set different tax schedules Ty(.) for labor income y ≡ wl and Tpi(.) for profits pi. More-
over, suppose the government can use any additional tax instrument that is contingent
on observables, such as the firms’ outputs or labor inputs. Then the main results are
that (i) the tax schedules Ty and Tpi are enough to implement the resulting constrained
Pareto optima, so that production distortions are no longer desirable, and (ii) redistri-
bution is no longer achieved indirectly through general equilibrium effects, but directly
through the tax system. As a result, optimal marginal tax rate formulas for workers and
entrepreneurs no longer depend on elasticities of substitution in production. Beyond con-
trasting these results with the uniform taxation case, this analysis is also relevant from a
policy point of view, since some countries indeed discriminate between the employed
and self-employed, as discussed in the introduction.
4.1 A Theoretical Characterization
4.1.1 Pareto Optimal Tax Formulas
When the planner is not restricted to a single tax schedule on profits and income, the no-
discrimination constraints (3) disappear, as do the constraints (6) and (7) that required the
equalization of marginal products across all firms. I am therefore left with the following
relaxed Pareto problem:
max
E(θ), L(θ), l(θ),
vE(θ), vW (θ), φ˜(θ)
∫
Θ
[
G˜θ(φ˜(θ))vE(θ) + (1− G˜θ(φ˜(θ)))vw(θ)
]
dF˜(θ)−
∫
Θ
∫ φ˜(θ)
φ
θ
φdG˜θ(φ)dF˜(θ)
s.t. φ˜(θ) = vE(θ)− vW(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ
v′E(θ) = E(θ)ψ′ (E(θ)/θ) /θ2, v′W(θ) = l(θ)ψ′ (l(θ)/θ) /θ2 ∀θ ∈ Θ
18See Naito (1999) for a related result in the two-class economy introduced by Stiglitz (1982), where
production inefficiency is shown to be optimal in an economy with a private and public sector.
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∫
Θ
Gθ(φ˜(θ))L(θ)dF(θ) ≤
∫
Θ
(1− Gθ(φ˜(θ)))l(θ)dF(θ)
∫
Θ
Gθ(φ˜(θ)) [Y(L(θ), E(θ))− vE(θ)− ψ(E(θ)/θ)] dF(θ)
−
∫
Θ
(1− Gθ(φ˜(θ))) [vw(θ) + ψ(l(θ)/θ)] dF(θ) ≥ 0
Clearly, the remaining incentive, labor market clearing and resource constraints are the
same as before. It can be seen from this formulation that the wages w˜ and w have now
dropped out of the planning problem. In other words, the pecuniary externality that re-
sulted from ruling out differential tax treatment in the previous section has disappeared.
This leads to the following proposition characterizing the Pareto-optimal tax policy.
Proposition 4. (i) At any Pareto optimum, YL(L(θ), E(θ)) is equalized across all θ ∈ Θ.
(ii) If there is no bunching, T′pi(pi(θ)) and T′y(y(θ)) satisfy
T′pi(pi(θ))
1− T′pi(pi(θ))=
1+ 1/εpi(θ)
θ f (θ)Gθ(φ˜(θ))
∫ θ
θ
[
G˜θˆ(φ˜(θˆ)) f˜ (θˆ)−Gθˆ(φ˜(θˆ)) f (θˆ)+gθˆ(φ˜(θˆ))∆T(θˆ) f (θˆ)
]
dθˆ
T′y(y(θ))
1−T′y(y(θ))=
1+ 1/εy(θ)
θ f(θ)(1−Gθ(φ˜(θ)))
∫ θ
θ
[
(1−G˜θˆ(φ˜(θˆ))) f˜(θˆ)−(1−Gθˆ(φ˜(θˆ))) f(θˆ)−gθˆ(φ˜(θˆ))∆T(θˆ) f(θˆ)
]
dθˆ
with ∆T(θ) ≡ Tpi(pi(θ))− Ty(y(θ)).
(iii) T′pi(pi(θ)) = T′pi(pi(θ)) = T′y(y(θ)) = T′y(y(θ)) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 4 shows first that, when allowing for different tax schedules Tpi and Ty,
production efficiency is always optimal, since the marginal products of labor and en-
trepreneurial effort are equalized across all firms. Thus, the non-linear profit and income
taxes are actually sufficient to implement any Pareto optimum: No additional tax instru-
ments distorting the firms’ input choices are required.19
Part (ii) of the proposition derives formulas for the optimalmarginal profit and income
tax rates. As usual, the optimal marginal tax rate faced by skill type θ is negatively related
19In a response to the results by Naito (1999), Saez (2004) has argued that the optimality of production
inefficiency disappears when the individuals’ decision is not along an intensive (effort) margin, but along
an extensive (occupational choice) margin. The present model includes both margins, and points out that
it is the availability of tax instruments that is crucial for whether there exists a pecuniary externality, which
in turn is the underlying reason for the desirability of production distortions.
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to the elasticity of profits (income) with respect to the after-tax wage
εpi(θ) ≡ ∂pi(θ)
∂w˜(1− T′pi(pi(θ)))
w˜(1− T′pi(pi(θ)))
pi(θ)
(and analogously for income) and the mass of entrepreneurs f (θ)Gθ(φ˜(θ)) at θ (this mass
is f (θ)(1− G(φ˜(θ))) for workers). This accounts for the local effort (labor supply) dis-
tortion generated by the marginal tax. The first two terms in the integral, in turn, cap-
ture the redistributive effects of the tax schedule, comparing the mass of Pareto-weights
G˜θˆ(φ˜(θˆ)) f˜ (θˆ) for all skill types θˆ below θ to that of the population densities Gθˆ(φ˜(θˆ)) f (θˆ)
(and again equivalently for workers). The last term in the integrals, finally, captures the
effect of differential profit and labor income taxation on occupational choice. Specifically,
the mass of agents of skill θ driven out of entrepreneurship by an infinitesimal increase in
profit taxation Tpi is given by gθ(φ˜(θ)) f (θ), i.e. those individuals who were just indiffer-
ent between entrepreneurship and employment before the change. The resulting effect on
the government budget is captured by the excess entrepreneurial tax ∆T(θ), which is the
additional tax payment by an entrepreneur of type θ compared to a worker of the same
skill. Of course, this budget effect appears with opposite signs in the optimality formulas
for the entrepreneurial profit and labor income tax schedule.20
As can be seen from the formulas in Proposition 4, key properties of the restricted tax
schedule characterized in the preceding section disappear as soon as differential taxation
is allowed. Notably, the tax formulas no longer depend on whether technology is linear
or not. Hence, no knowledge about empirical substitution elasticities in production is re-
quired to derive optimal marginal tax rates. Differential taxation thus justifies the focus
of much of the public finance literature on estimating labor supply elasticities and iden-
tifying skill distributions, quite in contrast to the case of uniform taxation considered in
the preceding section.
In fact, the wages w˜ and w earned by entrepreneurs and workers do not even appear
in the formulas. Moreover, the bottom and top marginal tax rates are always zero, both
for workers and entrepreneurs. In the present setting with a bounded support of the skill
distribution, these results show that differential taxation generally allows for a Pareto
improvement compared to uniform taxation: Since any Pareto optimum with differential
taxation must be such that the bottom and top marginal tax rates for both workers and
entrepreneurs are zero, any allocation that does not satisfy these propertiesmust be Pareto
20See Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2009) for similar results and interpretations in a model with a secondary
earner participationmargin. Rather than tracing out the Pareto-frontier, however, they work with a concave
social welfare function, which gives rise to different optimal tax formulas (see also Section 5).
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inefficient. But Proposition 2 has shown that, whenever uniform taxation leads to binding
no-discrimination constraints, the bottom and top marginal tax rates are not zero. Hence,
starting from such an allocation, there must exist a Pareto improvement using differential
taxation.
The following result is an immediate corollary of Proposition 4.
Corollary 1. With a constant elasticity ε,21 the average marginal tax across occupations satisfies
Gθ(φ˜(θ))
T′pi(pi(θ))
1− T′pi(pi(θ)) + (1− Gθ(φ˜))
T′y(y(θ))
1− T′y(y(θ)) =
1+ 1/ε
θ f (θ)
(
F˜(θ)− F(θ)) . (15)
Note that the formula for the average marginal tax rate across entrepreneurs and
workers of a given skill type is given in closed form on the right-hand side of equation
(15): It only depends on the elasticity parameter ε, the distribution of skill types as cap-
tured by f (θ) and F(θ), and the redistributive motives of the government in the skill
dimension, determined by the cumulative Pareto-weights F˜(θ). In particular, the distri-
bution of cost types φ, or redistributive motives in the cost dimension as captured by the
Pareto-weights G˜θ(φ), play no role. This implies a separation result for the implementa-
tion of Pareto optima: Average marginal taxes across occupational groups are set so as to
achieve the desired redistribution in the skill dimension. Then any redistribution across
cost types and hence between entrepreneurs and workers of the same skill is achieved by
varying the marginal profit and income taxes, leaving the average tax unaffected. In fact,
the formula for a Pareto optimal average marginal tax rate in (15) is the same as the one
that would be obtained in a standard quasi-linear Mirrlees-model without occupational
choice and with only one-dimensional heterogeneity in θ.22
4.1.2 Testing the Pareto Efficiency of Tax Schedules
Rather than determining the optimal shape of tax schedules for a given specification of
Pareto-weights, the results in Proposition 4 can also be used as a test for whether some
given tax schedules Tpi and Ty are Pareto optimal. This approach has been pursued by
21Even without a constant elasticity, a modified version of (15) holds, which is that
Gθ(φ˜(θ))
1+ 1/εpi(θ)
T′pi(pi(θ))
1− T′pi(pi(θ)) +
(1− Gθ(φ˜))
1+ 1/εy(θ)
T′y(y(θ))
1− T′y(y(θ)) =
F˜(θ)− F(θ)
θ f (θ)
.
Thus, except for the nicer expression, Corollary 1 does not depend on a constant elasticity.
22See Diamond (1998) for such an analysis. However, since in his model redistribution is determined by
a concave social welfare function rather than by Pareto-weights that trace out the entire Pareto-frontier, a
closed form solution for the optimal marginal tax rates as in (15) cannot be obtained.
19
Werning (2007) in the standard Mirrlees model, and provides an interesting reintepreta-
tion of the formulas in Proposition 4 in the present framework. In fact, since the Pareto-
weights G˜θ(φ˜(θ)) f˜ (θ) and (1− G˜θ(φ˜(θ))) f˜ (θ)must be non-negative, the following corol-
lary can be obtained immediately from Proposition 4:
Corollary 2. Given the utility function u(c, e) = c − e1+1/ε/(1 + 1/ε), a skill distribution
F(θ) and cost distribution Gθ(φ), the tax schedules Tpi, Ty inducing an allocation (pi(θ), y(θ))
and occupational choice φ˜(θ) are Pareto optimal if and only if
θ fE(θ)
1+ 1/ε
T′pi(pi(θ))
1− T′pi(pi(θ)) + FE(θ)−
∫ θ
θ
gθˆ(φ˜(θˆ)) f (θˆ)
G
∆T(θˆ)dθˆ and (16)
θ fW(θ)
1+ 1/ε
T′y(y(θ))
1− T′y(y(θ)) + FW(θ) +
∫ θ
θ
gθˆ(φ˜(θˆ)) f (θˆ)
1− G ∆T(θˆ)dθˆ (17)
are non-decreasing in θ, where G ≡ ∫Θ Gθ(φ˜(θ))dF(θ) is the overall share of entrepreneurs in
the population, fE(θ) ≡ Gθ(φ˜(θ)) f (θ)/G and fW(θ) ≡ (1− Gθ(φ˜(θ))) f (θ)/(1− G) are the
skill densities for entrepreneurs and workers, and FE(θ) and FW(θ) the corresponding cumulative
distribution functions.
For a given elasticity ε, conditions (16) and (17) can be tested after identifying the
skill and cost distributions from the observed income distributions and shares of en-
trepreneurs and workers for a given tax system. This identification step has been pio-
neered by Saez (2001) in a one-dimensional taxation model, and has been extended in the
working paper version (Scheuer, 2013b) to the setting with two-dimensional heterogene-
ity and occupational choice considered here.
Two remarks on Corollary 2 are in order. First, adding conditions (16) and (17) yields
another test for Pareto optimality, which is weaker but requires less information to be
implemented. In particular, a necessary condition for Tpi, Ty to be Pareto optimal is that
θ f (θ)
1+ 1/ε
[
Gθ(φ˜(θ))
T′pi(pi(θ))
1− T′pi(pi(θ)) + (1− Gθ(φ˜(θ)))
T′y(y(θ))
1− T′y(y(θ))
]
+ F(θ)
is non-decreasing in θ. This condition, relying on the average marginal tax rate of en-
trepreneurs and workers at a given skill level, only requires the identification of the skill
distribution F(θ), not of the cost density gθ(φ) (note that Gθ(φ˜(θ)) can be easily inferred
from the share of entrepreneurs at a given profit and hence skill level). However, this test
is obviously weaker since some tax systems that pass it may fail the test in Corollary 2
and thus be Pareto inefficient.
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Another special case of conditions (16) and (17) occurs when there is no occupational
choice, so that whether an individual is an entrepreneur or a worker is a fixed character-
istic. This can be thought of as a special case of the general formulation considered so
far, where the cost φ has a degenerate distribution with only two mass points, at φ and φ,
with φ (φ) sufficiently low (high). Then Tpi must be such that
θ fE(θ)
1+ 1/ε
T′pi(pi(θ))
1− T′pi(pi(θ)) + FE(θ)
is non-decreasing, and analogously for Ty replacing the (fixed) skill distribution for en-
trepreneurs by that for workers, FW(θ). This coincides with the integral version of the
condition derived in Werning (2007) for a standard Mirrlees model. Hence, the key dif-
ference arising from the present framework are the terms − ∫ θθ gθˆ(φ˜(θˆ)) f (θˆ)∆T(θˆ)dθˆ/G
and
∫ θ
θ gθˆ(φ˜(θˆ)) f (θˆ)∆T(θˆ)dθˆ/(1− G), reflecting the effects of taxation on occupational
choice and thus on the resource constraint. Note that, since these terms enter conditions
(16) and (17) with opposite signs, whenever one term is increasing in θ, the other is de-
creasing, so that ceteris paribus it becomes harder for differential taxation with ∆T(θ) += 0
to pass the test for Pareto efficiency the more elastic the occupational choice margin (and
thus the higher the cost density at the critical level φ˜(θ)). Corollary 2 thus demonstrates
that the differential tax treatment disappears at Pareto optima as the elasticity of occupa-
tional choice increases.
4.1.3 Comparing Optimal Profit and Income Tax Schedules
How do the optimal tax schedules for entrepreneurial profits and labor income compare
under given redistributive objectives and thus Pareto-weights? To shed light on this ques-
tion, I make the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1. θ and φ are independent and g(φ) is non-increasing.
These assumptions are strong, and are relaxed in the numerical explorations in the
working paper version (Scheuer, 2013b). Nonetheless, they allow me to obtain a theoret-
ical characterization of the pattern of differential taxation of profits and income. I start
with the case where the government aims at redistributing from entrepreneurs to work-
ers.
Proposition 5. Suppose that F˜(θ) = F(θ), g˜(φ) < g(φ) for all φ ≤ φ˜(θ), w˜ > w and
Assumption 1 holds. Then
(i) T′y(y(θ)) < 0, T′pi(pi(θ)) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ,
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(ii) ∆T(θ) > 0 and ∆T′(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ,
(iii) compared to the no tax equilibrium, w decreases and w˜ and L(θ)/E(θ) increase for all θ ∈ Θ,
(iv) w˜E(θ) < wl((w˜/w)θ) and vE(θ) < vW((w˜/w)θ) for all θ ∈ [a, b].
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The assumptions in Proposition 5 focus on the benchmark case where the government
does not aim at redistributing across skill types (since F˜(θ) = F(θ) for all θ), but puts
a lower social welfare weight on low φ-types (who end up as entrepreneurs) than their
density in the population. This generates a redistributive motive from low to high cost
types, and thus from entrepreneurs to workers. Corollary 1 immediately implies that,
in this case, the average marginal tax rate must be zero for all skill types. The first part
of Proposition 5 shows that, in fact, workers face a negative marginal tax rate and en-
trepreneurs a positive one at the optimum. Moreover, as a result of the redistributive
motive from entrepreneurs to workers, there is a strictly positive excess profits tax ∆T(θ),
which increases with the skill level.
It also turns out that the optimal policy involves a decrease in the workers’ wage, and
makes the input mix of all firms more labor intensive compared to the no tax equilib-
rium. This is quite in contrast to the intuition based on a “trickle down” argument, which
would have suggested a policy that increases the workers’ wage in order to benefit them
indirectly. Here, however, this is not necessary since workers can be overcompensated
for the decrease in their wage through the differential tax treatment directly, as captured
by the positive excess tax on entrepreneurs. The reason for the depressed wage w is that
the excess profit tax discourages entry into entrepreneurship, and therefore the workers’
wage must fall so that each firm hires more labor and the labor market remains cleared.
Finally, part (iv) shows that the optimal differential tax policy involves a lower income
and utility for entrepreneurs compared to workers who earn the same total wage on their
effort. This implies that, under Assumption 1 and the conditions on Pareto-weights in
Proposition 5, the no-discrimination constraints (3) and (11) in the previous Section 3 all
bind in the same direction and such that the optimal uniform tax schedule involves a
positive bottom and a negative top marginal tax rate (see Proposition 2 part (iv)).
If the Pareto-weights are such that F˜(θ) += F(θ) for some θ, so that redistribution across
skill types is also desirable, then a comparison of the tax schedules for entrepreneurs
and workers becomes more involved. A theoretical result is available for the following
benchmark case. Suppose that G˜(φ) = G(φ) for all θ ∈ Θ, but F˜(θ) += F(θ). Also, suppose
there is no occupational choice margin, but each individual’s occupation is in fact fixed
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and independent of the skill type, so that Gθ = G for all θ ∈ Θ. Then Proposition 4 implies
T′pi(pi(θ))
1− T′pi(pi(θ)) =
T′y(y(θ))
1− T′y(y(θ)) =
1+ 1/ε
θ f (θ)
(
F˜(θ)− F(θ)) (18)
for any w, w˜. Hence, when the occupational choice margin is removed, the optimal
marginal tax rates are the same for entrepreneurs and workers (and equal to the aver-
age marginal tax rate from Corollary 1), independently of the different wages in the two
occupations. This makes clear that any difference in the optimal tax schedules for prof-
its and income must be the result of an active occupational choice margin or a non-zero
correlation between ability and occupational choice, which is further explored in the nu-
merical simulations in Scheuer (2013b).23
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the optimal non-linear taxation of profits and labor income in a
private information economy with endogenous firm formation. I have demonstrated that
it is optimal to apply different non-linear tax schedules on these two forms of income,
removing the need for redistribution through indirect, general equilibrium effects and
production distortions. In addition, the quantitative importance of differential taxation
has been explored in a calibrated model economy.
While these points have been made in a particular even though flexible model, many
of the results do not depend on the specific assumptions made. I conclude with an infor-
mal discussion of possible re-interpretations and extensions.24
5.1 Social Welfare Function
Instead of tracing out the entire constrained Pareto frontier using general Pareto weights
in the two dimensions of heterogeneity F˜(θ) and G˜θ(φ), much of the literature on optimal
taxation following Mirrlees (1971) has confined attention to maximizing a social welfare
function. This typically takes the utilitarian form using a concave transformationW(.) of
23With fixed occupational choice and a share of entrepreneurs Gθ that is correlated with skills, the planner
would want to redistribute between the two groups whenever the total welfare weight on entrepreneurs,
given by
∫
Θ GθdF˜(θ), is not equal to their population share
∫
Θ GθdF(θ). Since such redistribution can be
achieved without distortions through (unbounded) lump-sum taxes and transfers in this case, the optimal
tax schedules would not be well-defined.
24I thank Roger Gordon for suggesting this discussion.
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individual utilities, so that the objective function would become
∫
Θ
[∫ φ˜(θ)
φ
θ
W(vE(θ)− φ)dGθ(φ) + (1− Gθ(φ˜(θ)))W(vW(θ))
]
dF(θ)
instead of (12). The resulting solution would select a particular point on the Pareto fron-
tier, which is why all the properties derived here for the entire set of constrained Pareto
optimal tax policies would continue to apply. In particular, since both the entrepreneurs’
and workers’ utilities are increasing in θ and the entrepreneurs’ utilities are decreasing
in φ, a concave welfare function W(.) would put more marginal welfare weight on indi-
viduals with low θ and high φ. Hence, the optimum would correspond to a point on the
Pareto frontier with Pareto weights F˜(θ) > F(θ) and G˜θ(φ) < Gθ(φ) for all θ and φ, i.e.
simultaneous redistributive motives from high to low skills and from entrepreneurs to
workers, as considered in the numerical analysis in Scheuer (2013b).
The advantage of using exogenous Pareto weights is that it makes the redistributive
motives in the two dimensions of heterogeneity fully transparent, and allows to separate
their implications for properties of optimal tax schedules, as shown in Section 4. It also
allows for the closed form marginal tax rate formulas in Proposition 4 and Corollary 1.
With a social welfare functionW(.), the structure of the tax formulas would be exactly the
same, but the marginal social welfare weights on entrepreneurs of skill type θ would be-
come
∫ φ˜(θ)
φ
θ
W ′(vE(θ)−φ)dGθ(φ) f (θ)/λ rather than simply G˜θ(φ˜(θ)) f˜ (θ), where λwould
be the (endogenous) marginal social cost of public funds, and analogously for workers
(see Diamond, 1998, and Kleven, Kreiner and Saez, 2009).
5.2 Determinants of Entry into Entrepreneurship
I have introduced the second dimension of heterogeneity φ to capture different idiosyn-
cratic preferences for or costs of entering entrepreneurship, which drive occupational
choice in addition to an individual’s skill type θ. This could include disutilities with
φ ≥ 0 (for example the fact that entrepreneurship is riskier than employment or setup
costs) and benefits with φ ≤ 0 (e.g. the value derived from being one’s own boss as a self-
employed). As formalized in Propositions 1 and 2 in the context of this model, whether
φ is mostly positive or negative in the population determines whether the entrepreneurs’
wage is higher or lower than the workers’ in equilibrium. In particular, if entering en-
trepreneurship is perceived as costly, equilibrium returns to entrepreneurship have to
exceed the workers’ wage as a compensation, and vice versa.
As shown based on evidence from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances in the longer
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working paper version (Scheuer, 2013b), the average hourly wage of entrepreneurs is
indeed higher than that of workers, suggesting that the support of φ is mostly posi-
tive. However, this evidence needs to be interpreted carefully. While De Nardi, Doc-
tor, and Krane (2007) also find that entrepreneurs have higher incomes than workers,
and Berglann, Moen, Roed, and Skogstrom (2010) confirm this pattern for wages, con-
trolling for hours, Hamilton (2000) and Blanchflower (2004) find lower returns to en-
trepreneurship than to employment. One difference that can explain this is the definition
of entrepreneurship. The latter studies set entrepreneurship equal to self-employment,
whereas the former consider individuals as entrepreneurs only if they are not just self-
employed, but also own and actively manage a business and hire employees.
The latter definition, even though common, is therefore likely to select the most suc-
cessful subset of the self-employed, whose business survives for long enough and grows
to the point that they end up hiring employees. But many self-employed leave entrepre-
neurship shortly after entering, and panel evidence suggests that even those who stay
report lower incomes than what they previously earned as workers (see e.g. Hamilton,
2000). These findings have been associated with non-pecuniary benefits to entrepreneur-
ship, corresponding to φ ≤ 0.25 On the other hand, since the present model is static, it
is best interpreted in terms of lifetime incomes, or wealth. Tergiman (2013) argues that
returns to entrepreneurship can be positive from a life-cycle perspective, and Quadrini
(2000) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) provide evidence that entrepreneurs have more
wealth than workers (although the direction of causation is unclear).
A standard justification for φ ≥ 0 is that it serves as a shortcut for the disutility
from the higher riskiness of entrepreneurship, which is not otherwise captured here.
Scheuer (2013a) accounts for this difference in risk between entrepreneurship and em-
ployment explicitly and also demonstrates how the results extend to a framework where
entrepreneurship requires investment and borrowing in frictional credit markets. This
turns out to provide an additional argument for differential taxation of entrepreneurial
profits: it is able to mitigate occupational misallocation that results from adverse selec-
tion in credit markets.
An alternative way of generating heterogeneity in entry into entrepreneurship con-
ditional on income would be through a Roy (1951) model, where individuals have a
two-dimensional skill type, with one (latent) skill for entrepreneurship and another for
employed work. Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) have analyzed optimal income taxation
in such a framework, generalizing it to an economy with different occupations, whose
25Another possibility would be that actual incomes do not in fact drop, and reported incomes drop be-
cause of easier tax avoidance by the self-employed.
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effective wages depend on the relative employment in the sectors through some aggre-
gate production function.26 They derive similar results for the case of uniform taxation,
but do not consider differential taxation of different occupations. An individual’s skill as
worker and entrepreneur need not be comparable in their extension, relaxing the assump-
tion made here that θ captures an individual’s skill in both occupations and the second
dimension of heterogeneity enters preferences only additively.
5.3 General Equilibrium and Spillover Effects
As the analysis in Section 3 has emphasized, in the present model, the optimal shape of a
uniform tax schedule crucially depends on the substitution elasticity between labor and
entrepreneurial effort. With linear technology, wages do not respond to the relative mag-
nitudes of entrepreneurial effort and labor, and hence the standard properties of the tax
schedule obtain. However, if there are complementarities between the two, even with the
constant returns to scale technology assumed here throughout, the optimal tax policy ex-
plicitly manipulates incentives for effort and entry into entrepreneurship to affect relative
wages and achieve “trickle down” effects.
I do not attempt to quantify the importance of such complementarities in this paper.
However, I suspect that similar effects would obtain in alternative settings. For instance,
if different firms produce different goods and there is monopolistic competition (as for
instance in Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), then entering firms would introduce new products
and thereby increase employment and the workers’ real wage, leading to the same effect
as here even though through a different channel. However, an analysis of optimal income
taxation would be more involved in such a setting due to the endogenous number of
different consumption goods and inefficiencies from imperfect competition.
Another complication that would arise in such a framework is the effect of external-
ities from entrepreneurship on optimal tax policy. Indeed, if there are positive spillover
effects from new businesses, e.g. through innovation, so that entrepreneurs are unable to
capture the entire social benefits they generate, there is yet another reason for a differen-
tial tax treatment of entrepreneurs and workers: it has to trade off the Pigouvian motives
for subsidizing entrepreneurial effort with the redistributive motives for taxing it. There
is little work on Pigouvian taxation in Mirrleesian settings with privately observed skill
heterogeneity, let alone the multidimensional heterogeneity considered here. The contri-
bution by Rothschild in Scheuer (2011) has addressed these issues in a Roy-type model
with two types of activities, a traditional one that exerts no externalities and an extractive
26They also allow for general preferences with income effects.
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one (interpreted as rent-seeking) that generates negative externalities. How their results
extend to settings where some activities generate positive externalities, as would be nat-
ural to assume for some entrepreneurs, is subject to ongoing research.
5.4 Further Issues
The analysis in this paper has ignored several other aspects of entrepreneurship and its
implications for tax policy. Notably, capital accumulation and additional choices available
to entrepreneurs, such as the decision whether to incorporate or not, have been abstracted
from. Accounting for these aspects would give rise to issues such as the reclassification
of entrepreneurial labor income into (favorably taxed) capital income, and the choice of
compensation through salaries, dividends or shares. These margins may be as important
as the decision whether to set up a new business, especially for large firms where own-
ership and management/entrepreneurship are separated. Even though I expect the key
mechanisms for optimal tax policy emphasized here to extend to such richer settings, a
more comprehensive exploration of these issues is left for the future.
References
ALBANESI, S. (2006): “Optimal Taxation of Entrepreneurial Capital with Private Informa-
tion,” NBER Working Paper No. 12419.
(2008): “Selection and Incentives: Optimal Taxation with Occupational Choice
and Private Information,”Working Paper, Columbia University.
ALLEN, F. (1982): “Optimal Linear Income Taxation with General Equilibrium Effects on
Wages,” Journal of Public Economics, 17, 135–143.
BERGLANN, H., E. MOEN, K. ROED, AND J. SKOGSTROM (2010): “Entrepreneurship: Ori-
gins and Returns,” Labor Economics, 18, 180–193.
BLANCHFLOWER, D. (2004): “Self-Employment: MoreMayNot Be Better,”NBERWorking
Paper No. 10286.
BOADWAY, R., N. MARCEAU, AND P. PESTIEAU (1991): “Optimal Linear Income Taxation
in Models with Occupational Choice,” Journal of Public Economics, 46, 133–162.
CAGETTI, M., AND M. DE NARDI (2006): “Entrepreneurship, Frictions, andWealth,” Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 114, 835–870.
27
(2009): “Estate Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth,” American Economic Re-
view, 99, 85–111.
CHARI, V., M. GOLOSOV, AND A. TSYVINSKI (2002): “Business Start-ups, the Lock-in
Effect, and Capital Gains Taxation,”Mimeo.
CHRISTIANSEN, V. (1990): “Choice of Occupation, Tax Incidence and Piecemal Tax Revi-
sion,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 90, 141–160.
CRAWFORD, C., AND J. FREEDMAN (2010): “Small Business Taxation,” in The Mirrlees
Review – Dimensions of Tax Design. Institute for Fiscal Studies.
CULLEN, J. B., AND R. GORDON (2007): “Taxes and Entrepreneurial Risk Taking: Theory
and Evidence for the US,” Journal of Public Economics, 91, 1479–1505.
DE NARDI, M., P. DOCTOR, AND S. KRANE (2007): “Evidence on Entrepreneurs in the
United States: Data from the 1989 to 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances,” Economic
Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Q IV, 18–36.
DIAMOND, P. (1998): “Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-shaped Pattern
of Optimal Tax Rates,” American Economic Review, 88, 83–95.
DIAMOND, P., AND J. MIRRLEES (1971): “Optimal Taxation in Public Production, I: Pro-
duction Efficiency,” American Economic Review, 61, 8–27.
DIXIT, A., AND J. STIGLITZ (1977): “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product
Diversity,” American Economic Review, 67, 297–308.
FELDSTEIN, M. (1973): “On the Optimal Progressivity of the Income Tax,” Journal of Public
Economics, 2, 356–376.
FUDENBERG, D., AND J. TIROLE (1991): Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge.
GENTRY, W., AND R. HUBBARD (2000): “Tax policy and entrepreneurial entry,” American
Economic Review, 90, 283–287.
GORDON, R. (1985): “Taxation of Corporate Capital Income: Tax Revenues Versus Tax
Distortions.,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1–26.
GRAVELLE, J., AND L. KOTLIKOFF (1989): “The Incidence and Efficiency Costs of Cor-
porate Taxation when Corporate and Noncorporate Firms Produce the same Good,”
Journal of Political Economy, 97, 749–780.
28
HAMILTON, B. (2000): “Does Entrepreneurship Pay? An Empirical Analysis of the Re-
turns to Self-Employment,” Journal of Political Economy, 108, 604–631.
KANBUR, S. (1981): “Risk Taking and Taxation: An Alternative Perspective,” Journal of
Public Economics, 15, 163–184.
KIHLSTROM, R., AND J. LAFFONT (1979): “AGeneral Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory
of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion,” Journal of Political Economy, 87, 719–748.
(1983): “Taxation and Risk Taking in General Equilibrium Models with Free En-
try,” Journal of Public Economics, 21, 159–181.
KITAO, S. (2008): “Entrepreneurship, Taxation, and Capital Investment,” Review of Eco-
nomic Dynamics, 11, 44–69.
KLEVEN, H. J., C. T. KREINER, AND E. SAEZ (2009): “The Optimal Income Taxation of
Couples,” Econometrica, 77, 537–560.
MEH, C. (2005): “Entrepreneurship, Wealth Inequality, and Taxation,” Review of Economic
Dynamics, 8, 688–719.
(2008): “Business Risk, Credit Constraints, and Corporate Taxation,” Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 32, 2971–3008.
MEH, C., AND V. QUADRINI (2004): “Endogenous Market Incompleteness with Invest-
ment Risks,”Working Paper, University of Southern California.
MIRRLEES, J. (1971): “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,” Re-
view of Economic Studies, 38, 175–208.
MORESI, S. (1997): “Optimal Taxation and Firm Formation: A Model of Asymmetric
Information,” European Economic Review, 42, 1525–1551.
NAITO, H. (1999): “Re-Examination of Uniform Commodity Taxes Under A Non-Linear
Income Tax System And Its Implication for Production Efficiency,” Journal of Public
Economics, 71, 165–188.
PANOUSI, V. (2008): “Capital Taxation with Entrepreneurial Risk,”Mimeo, MIT.
PARKER, S. C. (1999): “The Optimal Linear Taxation of Employment and Self-
Employment Incomes,” Journal of Public Economics, 73, 107–123.
29
QUADRINI, V. (2000): “Entrepreneurship, Saving, and SocialMobility,” Review of Economic
Dynamics, 3, 1–40.
ROTHSCHILD, C., AND F. SCHEUER (2011): “Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking,” NBER
Working Paper 17035.
(2013): “Redistributive Taxation in the RoyModel,”Quarterly Journal of Economics,
128, 623–668.
ROY, A. (1951): “Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings,”Oxford Economic Papers,
3, 135–146.
SAEZ, E. (2001): “Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Tax Rates,” Review of Economic
Studies, 68, 205–229.
(2004): “Direct or Indirect Tax Instruments for Redistribution: Short-run versus
Long-run,” Journal of Public Economics, 88, 503–518.
SCHEUER, F. (2013a): “Adverse Selection in Credit Markets and Regressive Profit Taxa-
tion,” Journal of Economic Theory, 148, 1333–1360.
(2013b): “Entrepreneurial Taxation with Endogenous Entry,”NBERWorking paper
No. 19235.
SHOURIDEH, A. (2010): “Optimal Taxation of Entrepreneurial Income,”Mimeo, University
of Minnesota.
STIGLITZ, J. (1982): “Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation,” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 17, 213–240.
TERGIMAN, C. (2013): “Entrepreneurship Does Pay,” Mimeo, Univeristy of British
Columbia.
TOPKIS, D. (1998): Supermodularity and Complementarity. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, USA.
WERNING, I. (2007): “Pareto-Efficient Income Taxation,”Mimeo, MIT.
ZECKHAUSER, R. (1977): “Taxes in Fantasy, or Most Any Tax on Labor Can Turn Out to
Help the Laborers,” Journal of Public Economics, 8, 133–150.
ZUBRICKY, J. (2007): “Flat Tax Reform in an Economy with Occupational Choice and
Financial Frictions,”Mimeo.
30
A Proofs for Sections 3 and 4
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Consider first the case φ
θ
≥ 0 for all θ. Analogously to the proof of Proposition 1, if w˜ ≤ w, then
φ˜(θ) = φ
θ
for all θ ∈ Θ (with the only additional argument that, since both occupations face the same tax
schedule on their profits (resp. income), there is also no tax advantage from entering entrepreneurship).
This, together with the fact that (13) and (14) must hold as equalities at an optimum, implies l(θ) = E(θ) =
vE(θ) = vW(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Clearly, the no tax equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 is Pareto-
superior, demonstrating that w˜ ≤ w cannot be part of a Pareto-optimum. The case φθ ≤ 0 is analogous.
To see that w˜E(θ) > (<)wl(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ, define pi(θ) ≡ w˜E(θ) and y(θ) ≡ wl(θ). pi(θ) solves maxpi pi −
T(pi)− ψ(pi/(w˜θ)), and analogously for y(θ), replacing w˜ by w. Note that −ψ(x/(wθ)) is supermodular in
(x,w). Then the result follows from Topkis’ theorem and w˜ > (<)w.
(ii) Let me recapitulate the Pareto problem as follows:
max
{E(θ), L(θ), l(θ),
vE(θ), vW (θ), φ˜(θ),w, w˜}
∫
Θ
[
G˜θ(φ˜(θ))vE(θ)−
∫ φ˜(θ)
φ
θ
φdG˜θ(φ) + (1−G˜θ(φ˜(θ)))vw(θ)
]
dF˜(θ)
s.t. φ˜(θ) = vE(θ)− vW(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ
v′E(θ) = E(θ)ψ′ (E(θ)/θ) /θ2, v′W(θ) = l(θ)ψ′ (l(θ)/θ) /θ2 ∀θ ∈ Θ (IC)∫
Θ
Gθ(φ˜(θ))L(θ)dF(θ) ≤
∫
Θ
(1− Gθ(φ˜(θ)))l(θ)dF(θ) (LM)
∫
Θ
Gθ(φ˜(θ)) [Y(L(θ), E(θ))− vE(θ)− ψ(E(θ)/θ)] dF(θ)
−(1− G(φ˜(θ))) [vW(θ) + ψ(l(θ)/θ)] dF(θ) ≥ 0 (RC)
vE(θ) = vW ((w˜/w)θ) , E(θ) = (w/w˜)l ((w˜/w)θ) ∀θ ∈ [a, b] (ND)
w = YL(L(θ), E(θ)), w˜ = YE(L(θ), E(θ)) ∀θ ∈ Θ. (MP)
Note that I have dropped themonotonicity constraint (9), assuming that it will not bind at the optimum (and
thus ignoring problems of bunching). Attaching multipliers µE(θ) and µW(θ) to the incentive constraints
(IC), λLM to the labor market clearing constraint (LM), λRC to the resource constraint (RC), ξv(θ) and ξE(θ)
to the no-discrimination constraints (ND) and κL(θ) and κE(θ) to the marginal product constraints (MP),
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the corresponding Lagrangian, after integrating by parts, can be written as
L =
∫
Θ
[
G˜θ(φ˜(θ))vE(θ)−
∫ φ˜(θ)
φ
θ
φdG˜θ(φ) + (1−G˜θ(φ˜(θ)))vW(θ)
]
dF˜(θ)
−
∫
Θ
[
µ′E(θ)vE(θ)+µE(θ)ψ′
(
E(θ)
θ
)
E(θ)
θ2
]
dθ −
∫
Θ
[
µ′W(θ)vW(θ)+µW(θ)ψ′
(
l(θ)
θ
)
l(θ)
θ2
]
dθ
+λLM
[∫
Θ
(1− Gθ(φ˜(θ)))l(θ)dF(θ)−
∫
Θ
Gθ(φ˜(θ))L(θ)dF(θ)
]
+λRC
[∫
Θ
Gθ(φ˜(θ))
[
Y(L(θ), E(θ))−vE(θ)−ψ
(
E(θ)
θ
)]
−(1−G(φ˜(θ)))
[
vW(θ)+ψ
(
l(θ)
θ
)]
dF(θ)
]
+
∫ b
a
ξv(θ)
[
vE(θ)− vW
(
w˜
w
θ
)]
dθ +
∫ b
a
ξE(θ)
[
E(θ)− w
w˜
l
(
w˜
w
θ
)]
dθ
+
∫
Θ
κL(θ) [w−YL(L(θ), E(θ))] dθ +
∫
Θ
κE(θ) [w˜−YE(L(θ), E(θ))] dθ. (19)
The transversality conditions are µE(θ) = µE(θ) = µW(θ) = µW(θ) = 0. Note first that, due to quasi-linear
preferences, λRC = 1. Then the necessary condition for L(θ) is
Gθ(φ˜(θ)) f (θ) [YL(L(θ), E(θ))− λLM]− [κL(θ)YLL(θ) + κE(θ)YEL(θ)] = 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ. (20)
Using the transversality conditions and considering the case w˜ > w, the necessary conditions for E(θ) and
l(θ) are
Gθ(φ˜(θ)) f (θ)
[
w˜− 1
θ
ψ′
(
E(θ)
θ
)]
− [κL(θ)YLE(θ) + κE(θ)YEE(θ)] = 0 (21)
and
λLM − 1θ ψ
′
(
l(θ)
θ
)
= 0. (22)
If Y(L, E) is linear, then YLL = YLE = YEE = 0 and thus (20) and (MP) imply λLM = YL(θ) = w for all θ.
Therefore, by (21) and (22),
w˜ =
1
θ
ψ′
(
E(θ)
θ
)
and w =
1
θ
ψ′
(
l(θ)
θ
)
.
Note that the first-order condition for the entrepreneurs’ and workers’ problem is
w˜(1− T′(w˜E)) = 1
θ
ψ′
(
E
θ
)
and w(1− T′(wl)) = 1
θ
ψ′
(
l
θ
)
,
so I obtain T′(w˜E(θ)) = T′(wl(θ)) = 0 at any Pareto-optimum if technology is linear. In the case w˜ < w,
the necessary conditions for E(θ) and l(θ) are analogous to (21) and (22), replacing θ by θ in (21) and vice
versa in (22). This then yields T′(w˜E(θ)) = T′(wl(θ)) = 0.
(iii) There are 3 cases to be considered:
Case 1: λLM = w.
In this case, (20) together with (MP) implies
κL(θ)YLL(θ) + κE(θ)YEL(θ) = 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ.
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Note that, with constant returns to scale,
YLL(θ) = −xYEL(θ) and YEL(θ) = −xYEE(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ, (23)
where x = E(θ)/L(θ) is independent of θ by (MP). Thus
κL(θ)YEL(θ) + κE(θ)YEE(θ) = 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ,
and then (21) and (22) imply T′(w˜E(θ)) = T′(wl(θ)) = 0 for w˜ < w. Otherwise, T′(w˜E(θ)) = T′(wl(θ)) = 0
by an analogous argument.
Case 2: λLM < w.
Now (20) and (MP) yield
κL(θ)YLL(θ) + κE(θ)YEL(θ) > 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ
and hence by (23)
κL(θ)YEL(θ) + κE(θ)YEE(θ) < 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Then (21) and (22) yield T′(w˜E(θ)) < 0 and T′(wl(θ)) > 0 for w˜ > w. Analogously, if w˜ < w, T′(w˜E(θ)) < 0
and T′(wl(θ)) > 0.
Case 3: λLM > w.
This case is completely analogous to case 2 with all signs reversed.
(iv) To prove the last part of the proposition, it is useful to rewrite the constraints (ND) and (MP) as
follows. First, with constant returns to scale, (MP) is equivalent to requiring that
x =
E(θ)
L(θ)
⇔ xL(θ)− E(θ) = 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ. (MP’)
Using this, we can write (ND) as
vE(θ) = vW ((YE(x)/YL(x))θ) , E(θ) = (YL(x)/YE(x))l ((YE(x)/YL(x))θ) ∀θ ∈
[
θ, (YL(x)/YE(x))θ
]
.
(ND’)
Then the Pareto problem is as in the proof of part (ii), with the only difference that maximization is over x
rather than w and w˜, and (ND) and (MP) are replaced by (ND’) and (MP’). Denote the multipliers on (MP’)
by κ(θ). The necessary conditions for L(θ) and E(θ) become (using w˜ > w)
Gθ(φ˜(θ)) f (θ)[YL(x)− λLM] + xκ(θ) = 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ, (24)
Gθ(φ˜(θ)) f (θ)
[
w˜− 1
θ
ψ′
(
E(θ)
θ
)]
− κ(θ) = 0 (25)
and the first-order condition for l(θ) remains as in (22). Moreover, the necessary condition for x is
∫ b
a
κ(θ)L(θ)dθ − d(YE(x)/YL(x))
dx
∫ b
a
ξv(θ)v′W
(
YE(x)
YL(x)
θ
)
θdθ
−
∫ b
a
ξE(θ)
[
d(YL(x)/YE(x))
dx
l
(
YE(x)
YL(x)
θ
)
+
d(YE(x)/YL(x))
dx
YL(x)
YE(x)
l′
(
YE(x)
YL(x)
θ
)
θ
]
dθ = 0 (26)
with a = θ and b = (YL(x)/YE(x))θ. Note that d(YL(x)/YE(x))/dx = −(YL(x)/YE(x))2d(YE(x)/YL(x))/dx,
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so that (26) can be written as
∫ b
a
κ(θ)L(θ)dθ =
d(YE(x)/YL(x))
dx
[∫ b
a
ξv(θ)v′W
(
θ˜(x, θ)
)
θdθ
+
YL(x)2
YE(x)2
∫ b
a
ξE(θ)
[
θ˜(x, θ)l′
(
θ˜(x, θ)
)− l (θ˜(x, θ))] dθ] ,
where I wrote θ˜(x, θ) ≡ (YE(x)/YL(x))θ to simplify notation. The RHS can be signed as follows. First,
d(YE(x)/YL(x))/dx < 0 by the concavity of Y and constant returns to scale. Next, v′W(.) > 0 by the
incentive constraints (IC). Finally, θ˜l′(θ˜)− l(θ˜) > 0 if theworkers’ effort l(θ)/θ is increasing in θ, as assumed
in the proposition. Hence,
∫ b
a κ(θ)L(θ)dθ is positive (negative) whenever ξv(θ) and ξE(θ) are negative
(positive) for all θ ∈ [a, b]. Moreover, κ(θ) must have the same sign for all θ by (24), so that the same
result must hold for all κ(θ). To determine the sign of the multipliers ξv(θ) and ξE(θ), note that the no-
discrimination constraints (ND’) are equivalent to imposing both inequality constraints
vE(θ) ≥ vW ((YE(x)/YL(x))θ) , E(θ) ≥ (YL(x)/YE(x))l ((YE(x)/YL(x))θ) (ND’≥)
and
vE(θ) ≤ vW ((YE(x)/YL(x))θ) , E(θ) ≤ (YL(x)/YE(x))l ((YE(x)/YL(x))θ) . (ND’≤)
We have ξv(θ), ξE(θ) ≥ 0 whenever (ND’≥) binds and (ND’≤) is slack, whereas ξv(θ), ξE(θ) ≤ 0 if (ND’≤)
is binding and (ND’≥) is slack. In the first case, all κ(θ) are negative, so that YL(x) > λLM by (24). Then
the top and bottom marginal tax rate results immediately follow from (22) and (25). In the second case, all
signs are reversed.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) With a proportional tax on the labor input of firms, entrepreneurs effectively face a wage τw rather than
the wage w that workers receive, and hence the Pareto problem is the same as in Proposition 2 with the
only difference that maximization is also performed over τ and (MP) is replaced by
τw = YL(L(θ), E(θ)), w˜ = YE(L(θ), E(θ)) ∀θ ∈ Θ. (MP”)
The necessary condition for τ yields
∫
Θ κL(θ)dθ = 0, and the necessary conditions for w and w˜ in the case
w˜ > w are
∫
Θ
κL(θ)dθ =
w˜
w2
∫ (w/w˜)θ
θ
ξv(θ)v′W
(
w˜
w
θ
)
θdθ +
∫ (w/w˜)θ
θ
ξE(θ)
[
1
w
l′
(
w˜
w
θ
)
θ − 1
w˜
l
(
w˜
w
θ
)]
dθ
∫
Θ
κE(θ)dθ = − 1w
∫ (w/w˜)θ
θ
ξv(θ)v′W
(
w˜
w
θ
)
θdθ −
∫ (w/w˜)θ
θ
ξE(θ)
[
1
w˜
l′
(
w˜
w
θ
)
θ − w
w˜2
l
(
w˜
w
θ
)]
dθ,
which implies ∫
Θ
κE(θ)dθ = −ww˜
∫
Θ
κL(θ)dθ (27)
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and hence
∫
Θ κE(θ)dθ = 0. To obtain a contradiction, suppose λLM < τw. Then (20) and (MP”) imply
κL(θ)YLL(θ) + κE(θ)YEL(θ) > 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ
and rearranging yields (since YLL < 0)
κL(θ) < −YEL(θ)YLL(θ) κE(θ) = xκE(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Yet this contradicts the above result that
∫
Θ κL(θ)dθ =
∫
Θ κE(θ)dθ = 0. Similarly, if λLM > τw, then
κL(θ) > xκE(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ, also yielding a contradiction. Hence, λLM = τw must hold at a Pareto optimum.
Then YL − ψ′(wl(θ))/θ = YE − ψ′(w˜E(θ))/θ = 0 and thus T′(w˜E(θ)) = T′(wl(θ)) = 0 follows from
the proof of part (iii) of Proposition 2, case 1. The case with w˜ < w is completely analogous and yields
T′(w˜E(θ)) = T′(wl(θ)) = 0.
(ii) If the government can distort the marginal products of labor across firms, e.g. through a non-linear
tax on labor inputs, then an entrepreneur of skill θ effectively faces a wage τ(θ)w, and (MP) is to be replaced
by
τ(θ)w = YL(L(θ), E(θ)), w˜(θ) = YE(L(θ), E(θ)) ∀θ ∈ Θ, (MP”’)
and (ND) becomes
vE(θ) = vW ((w˜(θ)/w)θ) , E(θ) = (w/w˜(θ))l ((w˜(θ)/w)θ) ∀θ ∈ [a, b] . (ND”)
Now the necessary condition for τ(θ) is κL(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, and for w˜(θ)
κE(θ) = − 1w ξv(θ)v
′
W
(
w˜
w
θ
)
θ − ξE(θ)
[
1
w˜
l′
(
w˜
w
θ
)
θ − w
w˜2
l
(
w˜
w
θ
)]
∀θ ∈ Θ. (28)
Note that (ND”) is slack either at θ or θ, which yields κE(θ) = 0 or κE(θ) = 0. Then (20) implies (together
with κL(θ) = 0) that YL(θ) = λLM or YL(θ) = λLM. However, whenever there exists some θ +∈ {θ, θ} such
that (ND”) binds, then (28) implies κE(θ) += 0 and thus, by (20), YL(θ) += λLM.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) After integrating by parts, the Lagrangian corresponding to the Pareto problem now becomes
L =
∫
Θ
[
G˜θ(φ˜(θ))vE(θ)−
∫ φ˜(θ)
φ
φdG˜θ(φ) + (1−G˜θ(φ˜(θ)))vW(θ)
]
dF˜(θ)
−
∫
Θ
[
µ′E(θ)vE(θ)+µE(θ)ψ′
(
E(θ)
θ
)
E(θ)
θ2
]
dθ −
∫
Θ
[
µ′W(θ)vW(θ)+µW(θ)ψ′
(
l(θ)
θ
)
l(θ)
θ2
]
dθ
+λLM
[∫
Θ
(1− Gθ(φ˜(θ)))l(θ)dF(θ)−
∫
Θ
Gθ(φ˜(θ))L(θ)dF(θ)
]
+λRC
[∫
Θ
Gθ(φ˜(θ))
[
Y(L(θ), E(θ))−vE(θ)−ψ
(
E(θ)
θ
)]
−(1−G(φ˜(θ)))
[
vW(θ)+ψ
(
l(θ)
θ
)]
dF(θ)
]
. (29)
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The necessary condition for L(θ) immediately implies
YL(L(θ), E(θ)) = λLM/λRC ∀θ ∈ Θ (30)
and hence the result.
(ii) Note that (30) together with constant returns to scale implies that bothYL(θ) andYE(θ) are equalized
across all θ, and I can therefore again write w˜ ≡ YE and w ≡ YL. Hence w = λLM/λRC and the necessary
condition for vE(θ) can be rearranged to
µ′E(θ) = G˜(φ˜(θ)) f˜ (θ)− λRCG(φ˜(θ)) f (θ) + g(φ˜(θ)) f (θ)λRC [Y(θ)− cE(θ) + cW(θ)− w (L(θ) + l(θ))] ,
(31)
where cE(θ) ≡ vE(θ) + ψ(E(θ)/θ) and cW(θ) ≡ vW(θ) + ψ(l(θ)/θ). Note first that, by Euler’s theorem,
Y(θ)− wL(θ) = w˜E(θ). Next, let me define the excess entrepreneurial tax (i.e. the additional tax payment
by an entrepreneur of type θ compared to a worker of type θ) as
∆T(θ) ≡ Tpi(pi(θ))− Ty(y(θ)) = w˜E(θ)− cE(θ)− (wl(θ)− cW(θ)) .
Then using the transversality conditions µE(θ) = µE(θ) = 0, I obtain
0 =
∫
Θ
[
G˜(φ˜(θ)) f˜ (θ)− λRCG(φ˜(θ)) f (θ) + g(φ˜(θ)) f (θ)λRC∆T(θ)
]
dθ.
By the same steps, the necessary condition for vW(θ) can be transformed to
0 =
∫
Θ
[
(1− G˜(φ˜(θ))) f˜ (θ)− λRC(1− G(φ˜(θ))) f (θ)− g(φ˜(θ)) f (θ)λRC∆T(θ)
]
dθ.
Adding the two equations yields λRC = 1. With this, I find that, for all θ ∈ Θ,
µE(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
[
G˜(φ˜(θˆ)) f˜ (θˆ)− G(φ˜(θˆ)) f (θˆ) + g(φ˜(θˆ)) f (θˆ)∆T(θˆ)] dθˆ (32)
and
µW(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
[
(1− G˜(φ˜(θˆ))) f˜ (θˆ)− (1− G(φ˜(θˆ))) f (θˆ)− g(φ˜(θˆ)) f (θˆ)∆T(θˆ)] dθˆ. (33)
Next, consider the necessary condition for E(θ), which is given by
G(φ˜(θ)) f (θ)
[
w˜− 1
θ
ψ′
(
E(θ)
θ
)]
=
µE(θ)
θ
[
ψ′
(
E(θ)
θ
)
1
θ
+ ψ′′
(
E(θ)
θ
)
E(θ)
θ2
]
.
Dividing through by ψ′(E(θ)/θ)/θ) and rearranging yields
w˜− ψ′(E(θ)/θ)/θ
ψ′(E(θ)/θ)/θ =
µE(θ)
θ f (θ)G(φ˜(θ))
(
1+
ψ′′(E(θ)/θ)E(θ)/θ2
ψ′(E(θ)/θ)/θ
)
. (34)
Note that the entrepreneur’s first order condition from maxE w˜E− Tpi(w˜E)− ψ(E/θ) is
w˜(1− T′pi(pi(θ))) = ψ′
(
E(θ)
θ
)
1
θ
,
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where pi(θ) ≡ w˜E(θ), and hence the elasticity of entrepreneurial effort E(θ) with respect to the after-tax
wage w˜(1− T′pi(pi(θ))) is
εpi(θ) =
ψ′(E(θ)/θ)/θ
ψ′′(E(θ)/θ)E(θ)/θ2 .
After substituting (32), this allows me to rewrite (34) as
T′pi(pi(θ))
1− T′pi(pi(θ))=
1+ 1/εpi(θ)
θ f (θ)Gθ(φ˜(θ))
∫ θ
θ
[
G˜θˆ(φ˜(θˆ)) f˜ (θˆ)−Gθˆ(φ˜(θˆ)) f (θˆ)+gθˆ(φ˜(θˆ))∆T(θˆ) f (θˆ)
]
dθˆ, (35)
which is the result in Proposition 4. The derivation for T′y(y(θ)) proceeds completely analogously from the
necessary condition for l(θ) and using (33).
(iii) T′pi(pi(θ)) = T′pi(pi(θ)) = 0 immediately follows from (34) evaluated at θ and θ and the transver-
sality conditions µE(θ) = µE(θ) = 0. Analogously, T′y(y(θ)) = T′y(y(θ)) = 0 is implied by the first order
conditions for l(θ) and l(θ) and the transversality conditions for µW(θ).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) By way of contradiction, suppose there exists some θ ∈ (θ, θ) such that T′pi(pi(θ)) ≤ 0 and T′y(y(θ)) ≥ 0.
By continuity of the marginal tax rates (from ignoring bunching issues), and the result that marginal tax
rates are zero at the top and bottom, this implies that there must exist a subinterval [θa, θb] of Θ such that
T′pi(pi(θ)) ≤ 0 and T′y(y(θ)) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ (θa, θb) and T′pi(pi(θ)) = T′y(y(θ)) = 0 at θa and θb. Using
F˜(θ) = F(θ), independence of θ and φ and the optimality formulas in Proposition 5, this implies
∫ θ
θ
[
G˜(φ˜(θˆ))− G(φ˜(θˆ)) + g(φ˜(θˆ))∆T(θˆ)] dF(θˆ) ≤ 0
on (θa, θb), with equality at θa and θb. Taking derivatives at θa and θb, I must therefore have
G˜(φ˜(θa))− G(φ˜(θa)) + g(φ˜(θa))∆T(θa) ≤ 0 and G˜(φ˜(θb))− G(φ˜(θb)) + g(φ˜(θb))∆T(θb) ≥ 0,
which can be rearranged to
∆T(θa) ≤ G(φ˜(θa))− G˜(φ˜(θa))g(φ˜(θa)) and ∆T(θb) ≥
G(φ˜(θb))− G˜(φ˜(θb))
g(φ˜(θb))
. (36)
The assumption that T′pi(pi(θ)) ≤ 0 and T′y(y(θ)) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ (θa, θb) and w˜ ≥ w imply by the agents’
first-order conditions
w˜(1− T′pi(w˜E(θ))) = 1θ ψ
′
(
E(θ)
θ
)
and w(1− T′y(wl(θ))) = 1θ ψ
′
(
l(θ)
θ
)
that E(θ) > l(θ) for all θ ∈ [θa, θb] and hence that
φ˜′(θ) = v′E(θ)− v′W(θ) =
E(θ)
θ2
ψ′
(
E(θ)
θ
)
− l(θ)
θ2
ψ′
(
l(θ)
θ
)
≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ (θa, θb),
where I have used the local incentive constraints (8). Hence, I obtain φ˜(θa) ≤ φ˜(θb). Next, note that by the
assumption in the proposition that g˜(φ) ≤ g(φ) for all φ ≤ φ˜(θ) and by the second part of Assumption 1,
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(
G(φ˜)− G˜(φ˜)) /g(φ˜) is non-decreasing in φ˜. With this, equation (36) yields ∆T(θa) ≤ ∆T(θb). But recall
that I assumed T′pi(pi(θ)) ≤ 0 and T′y(y(θ)) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ (θa, θb). Therefore,
∆T′(θ) = T′pi(w˜E(θ))w˜E′(θ)− T′y(wl(θ))wl′(θ) < 0 ∀θ ∈ (θa, θb),
where I have used (9) and thus E′(θ), l′(θ) ≥ 0. This implies ∆T(θa) > ∆T(θb) and hence the desired
contradiction.
(ii) Note first that part (i) immediately implies
∆T′(θ) = T′pi(w˜E(θ))w˜E′(θ)− T′y(wl(θ))wl′(θ) > 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Next, at θ, I must have
G˜(φ˜(θ))− G(φ˜(θ)) + g(φ˜(θ))∆T(θ) ≥ 0
by the same arguments as in the proof for part (i). Since G˜(φ˜(θ)) < G(φ˜(θ)) by the assumption in the
proposition, I obtain ∆T(θ) > 0 and therefore ∆T(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
(iii) Suppose w = YL increases and thus w˜ = YE falls compared to the no-tax equilibrium. Then part (i)
implies that E(θ) falls and l(θ) increases for all θ ∈ Θ compared to the no-tax equilibrium. Moreover, by
constant returns to scale, an increase in YL implies an increase in E(θ)/L(θ), and hence L(θ) must fall for
all θ ∈ Θ. Finally, note that
φ˜(θ) = vE(θ)− vW(θ) =
(
w˜E(θ)− Tpi(w˜E(θ))− ψ
(
E(θ)
θ
))
−
(
wl(θ)− Ty(wl(θ))− ψ
(
l(θ)
θ
))
=
(
w˜E(θ)− ψ
(
E(θ)
θ
))
−
(
wl(θ)− ψ
(
l(θ)
θ
))
− ∆T(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Since w increases and w˜ falls by assumption, and because of part (i), w˜E(θ)− ψ (E(θ)/θ) falls and wl(θ)−
ψ (l(θ)/θ) increases compared to the no-tax equilibrium. Moreover, since ∆T(θ) = 0 in the no-tax equilib-
rium and ∆T(θ) > 0 by part (ii) in the Pareto optimum with redistribution, I conclude that φ˜(θ) falls for all
θ ∈ Θ. Putting this together with the above results for E(θ), L(θ) and l(θ), this means that the labor market
clearing constraint (13) is strictly slack in the Pareto optimum. This cannot be part of a Pareto optimum,
however, since increasing L(θ) for some θ increases production and thus relaxes the resource constraint (14)
without affecting any other constraint nor the objective of the Pareto problem. A slack resource constraint
in turn cannot be Pareto optimal since consumption could be increased uniformly without affecting incen-
tives nor occupational choice, increasing the objective for any set of Pareto weights. This completes the
proof.
(iv) Since both E(θ) < (w/w˜)l((w˜/w)θ) and vE(θ) < vW((w˜/w)θ) compare individuals who earn the
same “total” wage but in different occupations, it is useful to define this total return to effort as ω ≡ w˜θ =
wθ′, where θ′ = (w˜/w)θ. Writing allocations in terms of these total wages, the inequalities can be expressed
as pi(ω) < y(ω) and vE(ω) < vW(ω) with pi ≡ w˜E and y ≡ wl. Since pi(ω) and y(ω) solve the individual
first-order conditions
1− T′pi(ω) = ψ
′(pi/ω)
ω
and 1− T′y(ω) = ψ
′(y/ω)
ω
and T′pi > 0, T′y < 0 by (i), the inequalities pi(ω) < y(ω) for all ω immediately follow. To see the second
38
result, first define ∆T(ω) ≡ Tpi(pi(ω))− Ty(y(ω)) and note that
∆T(ω) = Tpi(w˜E(θ))− Ty
(
wl
(
w˜
w
θ
))
> Tpi(w˜E(θ))− Ty (wl (θ)) = ∆T(θ) > 0,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that Ty(.) is decreasing by (i) and l(.) is increasing, and the
second from (ii). Moreover,
∆T′(ω) = T′pi(pi(ω))pi′(ω)− T′y(y(ω))y′(ω) > 0
by (i), which implies ∆T(ω) > 0 for all ω. As a consequence, Tpi(y(ω)) > Tpi(pi(ω)) > Ty(y(ω)) for all
ω, where the first inequality holds because Tpi(.) is increasing and y(ω) > pi(ω), and the second because
∆T(ω) > 0. This implies Tpi(z) > Ty(z) for all z. Finally, note that
vW(ω) = y(ω)− Ty(y(ω))− ψ
(
y(ω)
ω
)
≥ pi(ω)− Ty(pi(ω))− ψ
(
pi(ω)
ω
)
> pi(ω)− Tpi(pi(ω))− ψ
(
pi(ω)
ω
)
= vE(ω),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that y(ω) is optimal for a worker of total wage ω faced with
tax schedule Ty, and the second inequality follows from Tpi(z) > Ty(z) ∀z.
39
